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PROTECTING RIGHTS IN THE AGE OF 
TERRORISM: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 
ROSA BROOKS* 
I. THE BEST OF TIMES, THE WORST OF TIMES 
Depending on whom you speak to these days (and the mood in 
which you find them), international law is either practically moribund, 
or it's more vibrant and important than it has been for years. To take 
the good news story first, international law issues have been at the 
forefront of public discourse over the past few years. Pick your issue: 
the U.N. Charter and the international law on the use of force? The 
Convention Against Torture? The Geneva Conventions? You'll find it 
on the front page these days. Journalists are phoning international law 
professors for background briefings, and students are flocking to 
courses on international law and human rights. On law school faculties, 
even those grumpy sorts who have always greeted the mention of 
international law with a skeptical "harrumph" have taken to buttonhol-
ing their international law colleagues in the hallways, demanding an 
explication of how the Torture Convention regards so-called "stress 
and duress" tactics. 
Even the Supreme Court has weighed in, with recent decisions 
referencing everything from the European Convention on Human 
Rights (cited by Justice Kennedy in Lawrence v. Texas') to the Hague 
and Geneva Conventions (cited by Justice O'Connor in Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld 2 ). For international lawyers who have long labored in obscu-
rity, this is definitely good news. Right? Right. 
Good news, that is, except for the fact that these issues are in the 
news mainly because international law and institutions are also under 
attack as never before. Or, at least, this is the story emphasized by the 
many people who find themselves in very bad moods these days, who 
tend to feel that international law is at death's door-and as a result of 
an assassination attempt by the Bush Administration, not natural 
causes. Those who prefer this story can point to a host of examples. 
There was the Administration's "unsigning" of the treaty establishing 
the International Criminal Court. Then there was the Administration's 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
I. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003). 
2. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004). 
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refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to Guantanamo detainees, 
following White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales's memo advising the 
President that the Conventions were "obsolete." Mter that came the 
so-called doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense articulated by the Admin-
istration in defiance of long-standing interpretations of the U.N. Char-
ter and the subsequent invasion of Iraq, which U.N. Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan called "illegal."3 Not to speak of the Administration's 
efforts to evade international obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture and to stymie the Red Cross by holding some terror suspects as 
"ghost detainees" in secret locations around the globe. 
Both the good news and the bad news stories oversimplifY, of course. 
The true story, like most true stories, is complicated and ambiguous, 
and at this point, it is very hard to say whether "international law" as 
such is alive and well or in deep trouble. But though the longer-term 
legacy of this period of turmoil is not clear, it is important to note that 
the current challenges facing international law and institutions are not 
brand new. They did not appear suddenly in the wake of the September 
11 terrorist attacks, and they did not emerge as a direct result of recent 
Bush Administration positions. In fact, the challenges we are discussing 
in this symposium have been present, and growing, for some time; the 
post-9/11 environment has simply brought them to the fore. 
II. CHALLENGES: GLOBALIZATION AND "HYPERPOWER" 
I think it is fair to say that right now there are two fundamental 
challenges to international law. The first is the rise of non-state actors as 
influential participants in global affairs, and the second is the emer-
gence of the United States as the world's sole superpower. Let me 
discuss each briefly, and then turn to a particularly tough issue that has 
only gotten tougher, as a result of these recent developments: the 
challenge of protecting human rights in times of conflict. 
First, the rise of non-state actors. The international legal order is 
premised on the idea that states are the main actors in the international 
sphere and on the related legal fiction of sovereign equality. But 
globalization, in its many forms, has altered the state-centered interna-
tional order. Advances in communications and transportation technolo-
gies have enabled organizations to mobilize support across national 
borders and have enabled the development of numerous transnational 
forms of identity, from membership in Amnesty International to affilia-
tions with al Qaeda. Changes in weapons technologies challenge the 
3. Annan Says Iraq War Was "Illegal", BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16,2004, atAI2. 
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state's traditional monopoly on organized violence and enable rela-
tively small groups of people to do inordinate amounts of harm with 
shoulder-launched missiles, chemical weapons, and so on. Changes in 
the international financial system (which are related, of course, to 
better communications technologies) now permit multinational corpo-
rations to maintain a global presence and annual revenues rivaling 
those of many states. 
Today, non-state actors from NGOs to corporations to terrorist 
groups can have an impact on international affairs in a way that would 
have seemed unimaginable fifty years ago. In parts of the world where 
state structures are weak, such non-state actors can wield considerable 
local influence. In the Niger Delta, large oil companies perform many 
traditional governance functions-for example, building roads, schools, 
and hospitals.4 In many fragile states, international relief agencies do 
the same.5 In other societies, organized criminal enterprises and even 
terrorist groups exercise substantial control (consider the relationship 
between the Taliban and al Qaeda in Mghanistan). And in the interna-
tional sphere, non-state actors such as human rights and environmen-
tal NGOs have increasingly demanded a seat at the treaty-making table, 
with some success: NGOs have profoundly influenced the creation and 
shape of treaties from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court to the Kyoto Protocol. 
Globalization has challenged traditional understandings of interna-
tional law by permitting the rise of powerful non-state actors and by 
diminishing the control states once had over populations, finances, 
and organized violence. But traditional understandings of interna-
tional law are equally challenged by the second development men-
tioned above, the emergence of the United States as the world's sole 
superpower. The international legal system relies on the fiction of 
sovereign equality. Certainly some states have always been more equal 
than others; the U.N. Charter and the Security Council reflect the 
power balance that existed after World War II. But "balance" is the key 
word. Until the decline of the Soviet Union, no one great power was 
capable of dominating all others. Today, as an economic and military 
power, the United States clearly overshadows all other contenders. 
4. See, e.g., Norimitsu Onishi, As Oil Riches Row, Poor Village Cries Out, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
2002, at I. I. 
5. See, e.g., Allen Gerson, Peace Building: The Private Sector's Role, 95 AM.J. INT'L L. 102 (2001); 
Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of 
Accountability Under International Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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This is not to say that U.S. power is unlimited. Globalization means 
that the United States is constrained by an ever more complex spider 
web of institutions and economic relationships, and it has been no 
more immune from the effects of globalization than have other states. 
But the United States has also disproportionately benefited from 
globalization. Relative to all other states-and even to all other re-
gional groupings of states, such as the European Union-the United 
States maintains a unique capacity to act on its own rather than 
through multinational institutions. The Guantanamo Bay detentions 
and the invasion of Iraq are both cases in point. Each sparked enor-
mous international outcry from states around the globe, but neither 
was prevented nor significantly altered by global opposition. The 
United States has consistently been able to trump competing interpre-
tations of international law by dint of its superior power. 
Both globalization and the rise of the United States as sole super-
power (a "hyperpower," to its critics) predated the September 11 
terrorist attacks, and international law scholars were debating the 
implications of these developments well before September 11. Mter 
September 11, however, these issues ceased to be of concern primarily 
to scholars and international lawyers. Al Qaeda's devastatingly success-
ful attacks on the United States highlighted as nothing else ever had 
the increasing vulnerability of states to non-state actors. And U.S. 
government efforts to respond to these new kinds of security threats, 
complete with predictable overreactions, highlighted as never before 
the increasing asymmetry between U.S. power and the power of other 
states. In this sense, if international law faces serious challenges today, 
it is not merely because of September 11 or because of the U.S. 
government. It is because the international legal order is premised on 
various assumptions that bear less and less relation to the realities on 
the ground. 
Ill. PROTECTING RIGHTS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT 
I want to turn now from the general to the particular and address the 
challenge of protecting human rights in times of war and conflict. Here 
too, of course, it is important to begin by noting that human rights 
activists and scholars have been struggling for years with the very same 
set of issues discussed above. In important ways, the very existence of 
human rights law is (and always has been) a powerful challenge to the 
centrality of the state in international law. Mter all, human rights law 
insists on the limits of sovereignty. But human rights law (and its close 
cousin, international humanitarian law) is very much like the rest of 
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international law in that it has traditionally assumed that states are the 
primary actors. International human rights law has traditionally seen 
the state both as the primary threat to individual human rights and as 
the primary guarantor of these rights. Human rights treaties are, by 
definition, agreements between states. To the extent that they bind 
anyone at all, they bind states, not individuals or non-state organiza-
tions. 
The paradigmatic Cold War human rights violation was the jailing or 
torture of a political dissident by a repressive state regime. Since the 
Cold War ended, however, human rights advocates and scholars have 
increasingly drawn our attention to threats to human rights that come 
from non-state actors, such as insurgent groups or security forces in the 
pay of corporations. From the rise of child soldiers to the increase in 
modern forms of slavery, non-state actors are as likely to be implicated 
as state actors. Moreover, human rights abuses are as likely to result 
from state weakness as from overzealous state control. As human rights 
abuses by non-state actors have increased, human rights NGOs and 
states have both sought to develop new international norms and 
institutions to address these changing threats. Some institutions, like 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, seek to 
enforce international law directly against individuals who violate it. 
Others, like the U.N.'s Global Compact, seek merely to induce volun-
tary compliance from multinational corporations through norm enun-
ciation. 
The rise of globally diffuse terrorist networks presents only the latest 
in a series of challenges to those interested in protecting human rights. 
To begin with, terrorism is obviously a human rights abuse in itself, and 
human rights advocates share with governments the related goals of 
preventing terrorism and seeking to hold terrorists accountable for 
their violations of international law. There is no disagreement on this. 
The problem is not whether to try to prevent terrorism and punish 
terrorists. The problem is finding a way to respond to one massive 
human rights abuse without causing still more human rights abuses. 
To put it a little differently, the problem is responding effectively to 
the human rights abuses committed by non-state actors without eviscer-
ating the capacity of international law and institutions to protect 
individuals from the human rights abuses committed by states. This is a 
place where the twin challenges to international law that I mentioned 
earlier-the simultaneous rise of powerful non-state actors and rise of 
the United States as the world's most powerful state-each push in 
different directions. 
2005] 673 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTtl?NATIONAL LAW 
IV. TERRORISM AND THE LAw OF ARMED CoNFLICT 
It is not news that the Bush Administration regards the United States 
as being in the midst of a global war on terror. It is also no longer news 
that the Administration is not using the term "war" in a metaphorical 
sense, but in a literal sense. "War" is an archaic term, devoid today of 
clear legal content, but when the Bush Administration says that the 
United States is in a war against terrorism, it is nonetheless making a 
specific claim about the United States' legal prerogatives and obliga-
tions in combating terrorism. Concretely, the Bush Administration is 
claiming that the United States is engaged in an "armed conflict" with 
al Qaeda and that the applicable law governing the actions of both 
parties to the conflict is therefore the international law of armed 
conflict. 
One could, of course, object to the Administration's characterization 
of the struggle against terrorism as "war." The Administration's argu-
ment is that a criminal law framework cannot deal adequately with 
global terrorism. The scale of the September 11 attacks far exceeded 
the degree of violence associated even with particularly lethal orga-
nized crime networks such as drug traffickers. And al Qaeda's transna-
tional reach makes it difficult to combat using traditional law enforce-
ment tools. 
It is true that the challenges of terrorism require us to go beyond the 
traditional criminal law paradigm. However, if terrorism is not mere 
"crime," does that mean it is "war"? This is less clear, but a tremendous 
amount hinges on the distinction. In particular, if terrorism is concep-
tualized as "war" rather than "crime," that implicates a whole different 
regime of rights protection-one which, as we shall see, does not stand 
up well to the conceptual challenges that terrorism poses. 
If terrorism is conceptualized as a form of armed conflict, then the 
most clearly applicable body of law is what we variously refer to as "the 
laws of war," "international humanitarian law," or "the law of armed 
conflict." I will not address the technical disputes one might have over 
the proper label, nor go into the question of whether it is properly seen 
as a subset of human rights law or as a wholly separate body of law. 
Regardless, the function of the law of armed conflict is to tell us what is 
or is not permitted in times of conflict and struggle. 
The law of armed conflict is lex specialis, which is to say that it does not 
apply when there is no armed conflict, but it trumps other legal 
regimes when an armed conflict exists. This is why much is at stake in 
deciding whether terrorism is "armed conflict." If there is no armed 
conflict and peacetime rules prevail, then the U.S. Government is 
bound by the constraints of ordinary criminal law in its efforts to fight 
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terrorism. This means that terrorist suspects are entitled to the usual 
panoply of due process rights enshrined in U.S. law, in addition to any 
rights they may have as a matter of international human rights law. But 
if there is an armed conflict, the rights protection regime becomes 
more permissive and ambiguous, as a matter of both domestic and 
international law. 
Here, as in other areas of international law, the forces of globaliza-
tion and technological change make it difficult to apply the law of 
armed conflict in the context of current security threats such as 
terrorism. The concept of "armed conflict" itself is problematic. The 
Geneva Conventions reflect the state-centric approach traditional to 
international law; they evolved in an era in which most non-trivial 
armed struggles were between uniformed soldiers employed by states. 
In any given conflict, the assumption was that you could follow the 
paper trail right back to a sovereign state. Conflicts were fought over 
the control of territories and populations, and parties to the conflict 
could ultimately negotiate an end to the conflict through an explicit 
peace treaty. 
As a result, much of the law of armed conflict assumes interstate 
conflict and applies solely to interstate conflict. Only a very small 
portion of the law of armed conflict applies to conflicts that are not 
between states, and even here, the assumption is that conflict that is not 
between two or more states is instead between a state and an armed 
insurgent group. In any case, the law of armed conflict spells out the 
rights and duties of parties to non-interstate conflicts in far less detail 
than is provided for conflicts between states. 
As a threshold matter, a conflict between the United States and al 
Qaeda immediately creates legal conundrums. Al Qaeda is a very real 
threat: It has a proven capacity to kill large numbers of people in acts of 
organized violence (in addition to 9/11, al Qaeda has taken responsibil-
ity for the Kenyan and Tanzanian embassy bombings and the attack on 
the U.S.S. Cole, to cite just a few instances of its destructive capabili-
ties). Yet al Qaeda is clearly neither a state nor a traditional insurgent 
group. It does not seek to control territory or defined populations; it 
does not seek to engage in formal diplomatic relations; its "soldiers" 
wear no uniforms, share no common nationality, and operate across 
borders. This has caused some to argue that the international law of 
armed conflict cannot be applied at all to conflicts withal Qaeda.6 
6. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 675, 677 (2004); Press Release, White House 
2005] 675 
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Even if we accept that the law of armed conflict is applicable to 
conflicts with groups like al Qaeda, we still confront a range of legal 
puzzles. The law of armed conflict takes for granted, for instance, that 
conflict has reasonably clear spatial boundaries. The law of armed 
conflict makes certain conduct permissible in conflict zones, but not 
outside them. But if we are in a conflict withal Qaeda, and al Qaeda has 
members in states around the globe who are actively engaged in 
planning and carrying out operations against the United States, does 
this mean that every state containing such al Qaeda operatives is a 
conflict zone? If so, the war on terrorism is indeed a global war, and 
there are few states in which the United States could not lawfully carry 
out military operations. It is worth emphasizing that the distinction 
between conflict zones and non-conflict zones is not merely technical. 
Consider the 2002 U.S. missile strike against a truck full of suspected al 
Qaeda operatives in Yemen, which killed several people, including a 
U.S. citizen.7 IfYemen is a conflict zone, this preemptive strike against 
enemy combatants was legally permissible. IfYemen was not, the strike 
takes on the character of an extrajudicial execution. 
The law of armed conflict also assumes that conflicts have clear 
temporal boundaries. Various activities are permitted during the pe-
riod of conflict, but not after the cessation of hostilities. Prisoners of 
war, for instance, must be repatriated at the cessation of hostilities. But 
there is no likelihood of an "end" to the war on terror. The United 
States is hardly likely to sign a peace treaty with al Qaeda. And in any 
case, it is not clear that there can be any "prisoners of war" in the war 
against terror, since the Geneva Conventions grant that status only to 
regular soldiers who bear arms openly, wear uniforms, and satisfY a 
Press Office, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2003) (citing 
President Bush's affirmation that while the U.S. has an "enduring commitment to the important 
principles of the [Third] Geneva Convention ... the war on terrorism is a war not envisaged when 
the Geneva Convention was signed in 1949" and in this war the Geneva Conventions "simply [do] 
not cover every situation in which people may be captured or detained by military forces, as we 
see in Afghanistan today"), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/ 
20030507-IS.html; Amnesty International, Yemen: The Rule of Law Sidelined in the Name of Security 23, 
AI INDEX: MOE 31/006/2003 (Sept. 24, 2003) ("Under existing international humanitarian law, 
it is not possible to have an international armed conflict between a state on the one hand and 
a non-state actor on the other, should the armed group not form part of the armed forces of a 
Party to the Geneva Conventions .... "), available at http:/ /web.amnesty.org/library/print/ 
ENGMDE310062003. 
7. Dana Priest, CIA Killed U.S. Citizen in Yemen Missile Strike; Action's Legality, Effectiveness 
Questioned, WASH. PosT, Nov. 8, 2002, atAl. 
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range of other technical requirements.8 A conflict against al Qaeda or 
similar organizations also makes it harder than ever to determine who 
qualifies as a "civilian," with correspondingly protected status. As a legal 
matter, if we don't know how to categorize the dramatis personae, we 
don't know which people are entitled to which protections. 
Here I find myself in an extremely rare moment of agreement with 
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, who advised President Bush in 
a January 2002 memo that the war on terrorism makes certain provi-
sions of the Geneva Conventions seem rather quaint.9 To the extent 
that he was simply noting the obvious, Gonzales was quite correct. The 
Geneva Conventions were framed with other kinds of conflict in mind, 
and it is not easy to stretch them to fit a conflict between a state and a 
global terrorist network. As a result, as a strictly legal matter, it is far 
from obvious that the Geneva Conventions are fully applicable to the 
conflict between the United States and al Qaeda. 
But it is important to distinguish between legal questions and policy 
questions. In my view, the indefinite detentions at Guantanamo, the 
similar detentions of U.S. citizens Hamdi and Padilla, and numerous 
other U.S. government actions violate basic human rights norms. If the 
executive branch of the U.S. government can detain or kill people at 
will, based on unreviewable determinations that they are "enemy 
combatants" in a war that has no geographical boundaries and will 
never come to an end, then we might as well toss the whole idea of the 
rule of law out the window. As a policy matter, the way the Bush 
Administration has pursued the "war on terror" seems tragic and 
misguided: In the name of protecting us from the human rights abuse 
that is terrorism, the Administration has itself trampled on human 
rights. Nonetheless, as a strictly legal matter, if the law of armed conflict 
applies to the war on terror, none of these U.S. actions are clearly 
unlawful. Many are not clearly "lawful," either, but there is genuine 
ambiguity about what is permitted and what is required. 
If we care about human rights, we need to start by acknowledging 
that the Geneva Conventions were designed in a different era, and they 
do not fully reflect the unique challenges to both security and rights 
that we now face. Acknowledging this seems to me much better than 
8. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 4, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 134, 138, 140. 
9. Memorandum from White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales, to the President of the 
United States, Decision Re Application of the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the 
Conflict with AI Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan. 25, 2002), available at http:/ /www.msnbc.com/ 
modules/ newsweek/ pdf/ gonzales_memo. pdf. 
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burying our heads in the sand, since only if we understand the nature 
of the problem can we begin to think about different legal paradigms 
that are better adapted to the world as it is today. In the longer term, we 
need to find ways to combat terrorist organizations while ensuring that 
human rights are protected and vulnerable populations do not suffer 
needlessly. 
That is a long-term project, however. In the short term, we are in a 
perilous situation. The old legal framework designed to protect rights 
in times of conflict does not fit the facts well anymore, but we do not yet 
have a better legal framework to replace it. This creates the possibility 
of a very dangerous kind oflogical slippage, where genuine ambiguities 
in one area of the law lead the overly zealous (or the merely disingenu-
ous) to conclude that no legal rules need be followed at all. 
The obvious case in point concerns the ongoing scandals relating to 
U.S. interrogation practices. The endless hemorrhaging of leaked 
memos from the Bush Administration documents the kind of false 
syllogism I have in mind. It goes something like this: "The war on terror 
makes it difficult to know how and whether to apply the Geneva 
Conventions to detainees suspected of terrorism. Therefore, these 
detainees are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva Conven-
tions. Therefore, they are entitled to no protections at all and can 
legally be subjected to interrogation methods that would be considered 
torture or inhumane treatment under the Geneva Conventions. And 
since they are not entitled to the Geneva Conventions' protections, 
these interrogation methods are not torture or inhumane treatment." 
The logical slippage is apparent when you lay it out like this: We go 
from the claim that it is difficult to identify the rights of detained terror 
suspects under a particular legal regime to the claim that these detain-
ees therefore have no rights at all. 
We end up in an "anything goes" environment in which the abuses 
documented at Abu Ghraib became inevitable, and in which the Bush 
Administration cleared U.S. personnel to use a range of interrogation 
techniques such as hooding, frightening prisoners with dogs, keeping 
prisoners naked, dangerously hot, dangerously cold, in agonizing 
positions for hours at a time, and so on. We also continue to hear 
reports that the CIA received explicit clearance to use "water board-
ing," a technique in which a prisoner is subjected to simulated drown-
mg. 
To imagine that these techniques are legally permissible requires 
one to accept the fallacious reasoning outlined above. Even if the 
Geneva Conventions were as dead as the dodo, these techniques would 
violate both international and federal law. It does not matter whether 
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one looks at the Geneva Conventions and their minimal requirements 
for humane treatment, or customary international law and jus cogens 
norms, or the Convention Against Torture and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, or U.S. federal criminal law, or 
U.S. constitutional norms. There is no legal regime in which these 
techniques are permissible. 
One of the most chilling of the recent revelations well illustrates the 
slipperiness of these particular slopes. You will recall that some Bush 
Administration legal experts concluded that the President's inherent 
power as Commander-in-Chief trumps even conflicting federal laws, 
such as the torture statute or the war crimes statute. In other words, 
even if the interrogation methods approved by the Administration 
come to viewed by some future prosecutor as federal crimes, it does not 
matter, since the President is above the law whenever he acts as 
Commander-in-Chief. This completely eviscerates the delicate system 
of checks and balances upon which our democracy depends; one can 
imagine the framers of the Constitution turning in their graves. 
V. BAD NEWS, Gooo NEWS, AND AN IRONY 
I began by noting that there is some truth to both the bad news and 
the good news stories about the future of the United States and 
international law, and I want to return to the question of what the 
future holds. 
The bad news first, this time. I have suggested that the many 
challenges to international law and institutions result from two not 
unrelated developments. One is the rise of non-state actors as influen-
tial participants in global affairs, and the other is the emergence of the 
United States as the world's sole superpower. The difficulties inherent 
in trying to protect rights while combating modern security threats are 
illustrative of these broader challenges. But unfortunately, the Bush 
Administration has so far handled the struggle against terrorism in a 
ham-fisted manner, trampling on rights and needlessly alienating 
allies. By leaping from the valid conclusion that terrorism challenges 
traditional law of war paradigms to the invalid and dangerous conclu-
sion that there are thus no legal constraints on U.S. actions in the war 
on terror, the Bush Administration has done the political equivalent of 
throwing the baby out along with the bath water. This has created the 
perception amongst both our allies and our enemies that the United 
States is contemptuous of international law and institutions. As a result, 
many around the world now believe that the United States is hypocriti-
cal when it talks about human rights and the rule of law. This damages 
our national security interests in the long term: It pushes away friends, 
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empowers repressive regimes who point to our example, and provides a 
recruiting boon for our enemies. 
There is some good news, too, however. If September 11 dramatically 
demonstrated the power that non-state actors have to cause trans-
border devastation, and the overzealous U.S. response showed that a 
one-superpower world can also be a dangerous place, the years since 
9/11 have also pointed to the continuing vitality of international law 
and institutions. Many of the extreme positions initially taken by the 
Bush Administration have been tempered, partly in response to global 
criticism, and the need to sustain an international anti-terror coalition 
and stabilize post-war Iraq forced even the most extreme unilateralists 
to accept the value of international institutions. The simple fact that 
the many issues I have touched on here are subject to public debate is 
also genuinely good news. Although critics may bemoan what they see 
as the Administration's attacks on international law, it is not insignifi-
cant that the Administration denies that it is violating or undermining 
international law. On the contrary, the Administration has strenuously 
sought to justifY U.S. actions in the war on terror on the basis of 
internationallaw. 10 No one argues that international law is irrelevant; 
the terms of the debate are over how we should interpret and use 
international law. 
I will close by noting a nice irony. Many prominent members and 
supporters of the Bush Administration have been openly hostile to the 
idea of international law finding its way into U.S. courts. Consider the 
Administration's position on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 or its efforts 
10. See generally Brooks, supra note 6. 
11. In its brief in Alvarez-Machain, the Administration summed up its position on the Alien 
Tort Claims Act as follows: 
680 
Relying on the presumption that statutes do not have extraterritorial reach, the court of 
appeals held that respondent's arrest was not authorized by 21 U.S.C. 878, and was 
therefore tortious, because it was carried out in a foreign country. Applying the 
so-called "headquarters doctrine," the court then held that the tortious conrluct w~s 
actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) because it did not "aris[e] in a 
foreign country." 28 U.S.C. 2680(k). Both holdings cannot be correct. 
Indeed, as the government demonstrated in its opening brief, both holdings are 
wrong. While the arrest did, in fact, occur abroad, the court of appeals' reliance on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality to find the authority to arrest absent was 
misplaced for a number of reasons, including that the relevant statute applies to all 
felonies, a number of which expressly cover extraterritorial conduct, and that the 
presumption does not apply to statutes that grant the Executive Branch authority to 
enforce the law, as Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927), makes clear. The court's 
application of the "headquarters doctrine" is equally misguided, and irreconcilable 
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to convince courts of the irrelevance of international norms to the U.S. 
death penalty. 12 Notwithstanding its usual hostility to the idea that 
international law should be directly (or even indirectly) applicable in 
U.S. courts, the Bush Administration has recently insisted, in several 
terrorism-related cases, that international law effectively trumps even 
the U.S. Constitution. 
Recall the government's position in the Hamdi and Padilla cases, for 
instance. The Bush Administration's argument boiled down to a single 
with the text of the FTCA, because, among other things, every element of the alleged 
tort occurred in Mexico. 
More broadly, the court below erred in limiting the Executive's authority to 
enforce the law extraterritorially at the same time it vastly expanded the role of Article 
III courts in applying the law abroad, despite the FTCA's foreign-£ountry exception. 
The result cannot be squared with either the text of the relevant statutes or the 
Constitution's allocation of power over foreign relations. 
Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting Petitioner at 1-2, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
12. This is well-illustrated by language from the Solicitor General's brief in Medellin: 
Petitioner seeks a holding from this Court that the ICJ's Avena decision is the product 
of a binding treaty obligation, giving him a judicially enforceable right to review and 
reconsideration of his com~ction and sentence; alternatively, he asks that Avena be 
enforced as a matter of comity. This Court should not address those claims. Petitioner, 
who was denied a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, requires a certificate of 
appealability in order to pursue the merits of his claims on appeal. He is, however, 
jurisdictionally barred from obtaining a COA. First, a COA may be obtained only for 
constitutional claims, not for treaty claims. Second, a COA may not issue in this case 
because petitioner cannot meet the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
requirement to show that the state court's denial of relief was contrary to, or an 
unreasonable application of, any holding of this Court. To the contrary, the state 
court's decision was consistent with this Court's decision in Breard. The Court should 
therefore either affirm the judgment below or dismiss the writ as improvidently 
granted. 
Should the Court reach the merits, it should reject petitioner's reliance on international treaties 
and the !Cj's decision as free-standing sources of law under which he can obtain judicial review 
and reconsideration of his conviction and sentence. Neither the Vienna Convention, the 
Optional Protocol, nor the U.N. Charter-the relevant treaties at issue-provides 
petitioner with judicially enforceable private rights. Article 36 of the Vienna Conven-
tion confers no private, judicially enforceable rights, and the ICJ decision, standing 
alone, establishes solely an international obligation for the United States. It is for the 
President, not the courts, to determine whether the United States should comply with 
the decision, and, if so, how. 
Brieffor the United States as Amicus Supporting Respondent at 8-9, Medellin v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 
1622 (2005) (No. 04-5928) (emphasis added). 
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claim: When the President announces that an armed conflict exists and 
designates someone an "enemy combatant," the international law of 
armed conflict immediately displaces constitutional law in U.S. courts. 13 
This was the Administration's justification for plucking Hamdi and 
Padilla, both U.S. citizens, out of the civilian court system and holding 
them indefinitely in military detention, without charge, trial, or access 
to counsel. Such executive actions are clearly constitutionally impermis-
sible, but the Administration's claim was that this did not matter, 
because its actions were lawful under its own (controversial) reading of 
the international law of armed conflict. And note that the Administra-
tion backed its claims not merely by citing the Geneva Conventions, but 
also by citing norms of customary international law, a mushy concept at 
which it normally sneers. 14 
The Supreme Court did not accept this position, which is fortunate 
from the perspective of substantive right. In Hamdi, the Court instead 
insisted that "a state of war is not a blank check for the President when 
it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." 15 Still, few ever expected 
to see the Bush Administration arguing for the direct applicability of 
international law in U.S. courts-any more than one expected to see 
human rights advocates insisting on a rigid and formalistic reading of 
international law, as some have done in an effort to counter Bush 
Administration claims about the "obsolescence" of the Geneva Conven-
tions.16 
Instead where we will go from here remains to be seen, but these 
ironies suggest that the future of international law and institutions is 
neither clearly sunny nor clearly dark. As always, we face a complex mix 
of challenges and opportunities. What happens next depends on 
us-on our willingness to confront uncomfortable realities, our willing-
ness to think clearheadedly about emerging challenges, and, most of 
all, our willingness to continue this debate. 
13. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. at 2636; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715-16 
(2004). 
14. See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2653. 
15. !d. at 2650. 
16. See generally Amnesty International, supra note 6. 
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